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Ranging and Location attacks on 802.11 FTM

Jerome Henry 1 Yann Busnel 2, 3 Romaric Ludinard 4, 2 Nicolas Montavont 5, 2
3 DIONYSOS - Dependability Interoperability and perfOrmance aNalYsiS Of networkS
Inria Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique , IRISA-D2 - RÉSEAUX, TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION ET SERVICES
4 ADOPNET - Advanced technologies for operated networks
UR1 - Université de Rennes 1, IMT Atlantique - IMT Atlantique Bretagne-Pays de la Loire, IRISA-D2 - RÉSEAUX, TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION ET SERVICES
5 OCIF - Objets communicants pour l'Internet du futur
IMT Atlantique - IMT Atlantique Bretagne-Pays de la Loire, IRISA-D2 - RÉSEAUX, TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION ET SERVICES
Abstract : 802.11 Fine Timing Measurement is an indoor ranging technique. Because it is unauthenticated and unprotected, our experiments indicate that an adversary can implement ranging and location attacks, causing an unsuspecting client to incorporate forged values into its location computation. FTM clients tend to range against a small set of responders (top 3 to 6 responders with strongest signal). Once ranges have been collected, the client can compute its location using various techniques, such as 3-sphere intersection, matrix error minimization techniques or Kalman filter. Irrespective of the technique, we show in this paper that an attacker can cause a ranging client to deviate from its intended path, which can have dire consequences in some settings (e.g., automatic shuttle in public venue causing damages). We also show that protection intended for attacks on comparable ranging techniques, like GPS, are ineffective in the case of FTM.
Keywords : FTM 802.11az location
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https://hal-imt-atlantique.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03265600
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Submitted on : Monday, June 21, 2021 - 9:46:10 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, October 19, 2021 - 11:04:37 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Wednesday, September 22, 2021 - 6:12:56 PM

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  • HAL Id : hal-03265600, version 2

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Jerome Henry, Yann Busnel, Romaric Ludinard, Nicolas Montavont. Ranging and Location attacks on 802.11 FTM. PIMRC 2021: IEEE 32nd Annual International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications, Sep 2021, Oulu, Finland. pp.1-6. ⟨hal-03265600v2⟩

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